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ALD-182 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 09-4147
                              
KENNETH FORTUNE,
Appellant
v.
CARL HAMBERGER; Unit Manager; MARTIN DRAGOVICH, Superintendent; 
THOMAS L. JAMES; Chief Grievance Coordinator; C.O. BASEMORE, Guard; 
CAROL BAHER, Hearing Examiner; C. O. LITCHARD, Guard; C.O. WRIT, Sergeant; 
C. O. HARMON, Sergeant; ROBERT STEVENS, Unit Manager; KAREN
PATTERSON, Accountant; JEAN W. SCOTT, Business Manager; DONALD L.
KECHNER, Superintendent; C. O. CRAIG, Guard; ROBERT S. BITNER, Chief Hearing
Examiner; JOHN ANDRADE, Hearing Examiner; SHARON M. BURK, Chief Grievance
Coordinator; LOUIS S. FOLINO, Superintendent; C. O. NICOLLETTI; LIEUTENANT
AGOSTINO
                              
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-377)
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
                              
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 29, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 7, 2010)
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OPINION
                              
PER CURIAM
Kenneth Fortune, a pro se prisoner, appeals from a judgment entered by the
District Court in favor of the Defendants.  We will affirm.  See I.O.P. 10.6.   
I.
Fortune is currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
(DOC) at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette (SCI-Fayette).  Fortune brought an
action in the District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individuals employed by
the DOC alleging events purported to have occurred while he was imprisoned at the State
Correctional Institution at Greene (SCI-Greene) and the State Correctional Institution at
Camp Hill (SCI-Camp Hill).
In his amended complaint, Fortune alleged that the Defendants violated his First,
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  More specifically, he alleged that
various individuals violated his rights through the following actions: 1) restricting the
quantity of legal materials that he was able to maintain in his cell at any given time; 2)
unlawfully opening legal mail outside of his presence; 3) attempting to coerce him into
signing a privileged correspondence log on one date in order to receive one piece of legal
mail; 4) ordering him to see a psychologist; 5) issuing him several false misconducts; 6)
denying him showers, exercise, and hygiene materials; 7) subjecting him to a retaliatory
     Specifically, Fortune claims that the issuance of two misconducts; the denial of1
showers, exercise, and hygiene materials; his transfer to SCI-Greene; the switching of his
migraine medicine; the removal of his excess legal documents; and the denial of
“anticipated postage” were retaliatory in nature.
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transfer; 8) improperly switching his migraine medication; 9) improperly deducting funds
from his inmate account; 10) denying him “anticipated postage;” and 11) not permitting
him to make sufficient copies of legal materials.  Fortune also claims that some of these
actions were retaliatory in nature.1
This case was extensively litigated before the District Court, which disposed of
Fortune’s claims in several thorough decisions.  Following the filing of Fortune’s
amended complaint, the District Court granted Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.  After discovery concluded, the District Court granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all but one of Fortune’s claims.  Because
the Defendants had not addressed the remaining claim in their summary judgment motion,
the District Court granted them leave to file a second  motion for summary judgment on
that claim.  In a September 28, 2009 decision, the District Court granted Defendants’
second motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment in their favor.  Fortune
filed a timely notice of appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of
the District Court’s dismissals for failure to state a claim is plenary.  Port Auth. of N.Y.
4and N. J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999).  When considering a
District Court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), we must “accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the
plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233
(3d Cir. 2008). 
We review a District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Pennsylvania
Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).  Summary judgment is proper
only if it appears “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Carrasca
v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 832-33 (3d Cir. 2002).  If a moving party demonstrates that no
genuine issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts
showing a genuine material issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of its pleadings.  Connors v. Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 489 (3d Cir. 1994). 
We will affirm on any ground supported by the record.  See, e.g., Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  After reviewing the record on appeal and
the District Court’s thorough decisions, we conclude that the District Court committed no
reversible error in disposing of Fortune’s claims.
Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss
First, the District Court correctly dismissed, on statute of limitations grounds,
5Fortune’s claim that the Defendants improperly seized his “core legal materials” in 1999. 
Fortune asserted that because his materials were taken, he was unable to adequately
prepare for a then-pending state court action.
A claim is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on statute of limitations
grounds if the untimeliness of the claim is apparent on its face.  See Oshiver v. Levin,
Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).  While 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 does not set forth a limitations period, “federal courts must look to the statute of
limitations governing analogous state causes of actions.”  Urrutia v. Harrisburg County
Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 457 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996).
Here, as the District Court explained, the applicable statute of limitations is that
governing personal injury claims in Pennsylvania.  See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
387 (2007).  Therefore, Fortune had two years from the time his cause of action accrued
to file his complaint.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(2).  A § 1983 cause of action
accrues on the date when a plaintiff knew or should have known his rights had been
violated.  See Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991).
Fortune knew or should have known that his materials were taken in 1999.  However, he
did not file his complaint in the District Court until March 2004.  Accordingly, we agree
that the claim is untimely and the District Court properly dismissed it on that basis.
Second, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Defendants
Hamberger, Dragovich, James, Baker, Bitner, Stevens, Andrade, and Folino from the
     As discussed earlier, Fortune’s claim that Defendants confiscated his “core legal2
materials” in violation of his constitutional rights is barred by the statute of limitations.  
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action as Fortune’s failure in his amended complaint to allege personal involvement on
the part of those individuals was fatal to the claims against them.  See Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
Access to Courts
As mentioned, Fortune’s amended complaint contained numerous allegations that
various DOC employees acted in ways that frustrated his right of access to the courts. 
More specifically, he alleged, inter alia, that his “core legal materials” were taken and/or
restricted,  he was denied anticipated postage, and an informal appellate brief was taken2
from him for brief periods of time.
Prisoners have a fundamental right to access the courts.  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 346 (1996).  However, a prisoner making an access-to-courts claim is required to
show that the denial of access caused actual injury.  Id. at 352-54.  Actual injury occurs
when a prisoner demonstrates that a “nonfrivolous” and “arguable” claim was lost
because of the denial of access to the courts.  Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415
(2002).  We agree with the District Court that Fortune failed on summary judgment to
show any actual injury resulting from the alleged denial of access to the courts.
Free Speech Claim
7The District Court also correctly granted summary judgment on Fortune’s claim
that the Defendants violated his First Amendment right to free speech by opening his
legal mail outside of his presence.  Fortune claims that on one occasion, in September
2005, Defendants Nicolleti and Agostino opened his legal mail outside of his presence
and then conspired to have him sign a back-dated log so that Fortune could not later file a
grievance against them for doing so.  The District Court correctly determined that a single
instance of interference with an inmate’s mail is not sufficient to constitute a First
Amendment violation.  See Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1452 (3d Cir. 1995),
abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
Retaliation Claims
We also agree with the District Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding Fortune’s retaliation claims.  Fortune claims that several Defendants retaliated
against him in various ways for filing grievances and lawsuits against them.  To show
retaliation, a prisoner must demonstrate that he was engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct, that prison officials caused him to suffer “adverse action,” and that his
constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating factor in the officials’ decision to
discipline him.  Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Rauser v.
Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)).  Prison officials may prevail by proving that
they would have made the same decision even if the prisoner was not engaging in
constitutionally protected conduct.  Id.
8Fortune claimed that Defendants Basemore and Wirt retaliated against him for
filing various lawsuits against the DOC by issuing him two separate misconducts in June
2002 – nos. A364867 and A364873.  However, the record shows that misconduct number
A364867 was issued as a result of Fortune’s refusal to obey an order to report to the
office of a psychologist, pursuant to a mandatory pass.  At the misconduct hearing,
Fortune stated that he did not want to go to the appointment because he had a right to
refuse medical treatment.  The hearing examiner found Fortune guilty of refusing to obey
a lawful order to go to an appointment.  Thus, the misconduct was not issued due to
Fortune’s filing of a prior grievance or lawsuit, but instead for his failure to comply with
an order.  Similarly, misconduct number A364873 was issued to Fortune after he
threatened an employee with bodily harm and used abusive language.  Apparently,
Fortune believed that he was missing property and accused the prison employee of taking
the property while he was in confined in the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU).  At the
misconduct hearing, the examiner found Fortune guilty of using abusive language, but
dismissed the charge for threatening an employee with bodily harm.
While the filing of grievances and lawsuits against prison officials constitutes
constitutionally protected activity, see Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir.
1981), the District Court correctly determined that there was no causal nexus between the
issuing of misconducts in June 2002 and Fortune’s pending lawsuits and/or grievances. 
The misconducts were issued because he violated prison regulations.  See Carter, 292
     The District Court also properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on3
Fortune’s claims that he was denied “anticipated postage,” access to the library, and the
ability to make copies of certain legal documents in retaliation for his filing of various
grievances against them.  The record reflects that Defendants’ decisions concerning the
appropriateness of Fortune’s postage and his ability to access the library and make copies
were all made in accordance with established DOC policy.  Again, Fortune did not
challenge the validity of those DOC policies.
9
F.3d at 158.
The District Court also properly granted summary judgment on Fortune’s claim
that Defendants Litchard, Craig, and Harmon retaliated against him by removing eight
boxes of legal documents while he was in confined in the RHU in June 2002.  On the date
that the boxes were confiscated, he was told that pursuant to DOC policy, he was allowed
only to keep his personal property, including legal records, and that the items could be
stored in one foot locker and two record center boxes.  Upon Fortune’s refusal to sort
through his materials, the excess boxes were confiscated.  As the District Court pointed
out, the Defendants were in compliance with procedures outlined in DC-ADM 815 when
they confiscated Fortune’s excess boxes.  Fortune did not challenge the validity of that
policy.  Thus, because the Defendants limiting of Fortune’s personal property was
dictated by established DOC policy, and because Fortune’s claim of retaliation is
unsupported by any record evidence, Defendants were properly granted summary
judgment.  3
Regarding Fortune’s transfer to SCI-Greene in August 2002, there was sufficient
uncontroverted evidence presented that the transfer occurred due to his history of
10
assaultive behavior and his poor prison adjustment at SCI-Camp Hill.  Thus, because the
Defendants demonstrated a legitimate penological reason for the transfer, Rauser, 241
F.32 at 333, they were entitled to summary judgment on the claim.
Eighth Amendment Claims 
 Fortune’s alleges while he was confined in the RHU from June 3, 2002 until June
18, 2002, Defendants Litchard, Craig, and Harmon denied him showers, exercise, and
hygienic materials in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.  The relevant Eighth
Amendment inquiry is whether the alleged deprivation is “sufficiently serious” and
whether the inmate has been deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).  This requires an inmate to show that “he is incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and that prison officials
demonstrated a “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety.  Id. 
Fortune has not provided any evidence that might raise a genuine issue of material
fact regarding the condition of his confinement in the RHU.  As mentioned, Fortune
complained of his inability to adequately shower and exercise for a period of fifteen days. 
Although it is not clear how many times Fortune believes that he should have been
permitted to engage in those activities in addition to the time he was already given to do
so, he does not allege that he suffered any harm as a result of the denial of additional
showers and exercise.
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Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Fortune has not set forth facts
demonstrating that the alleged denial of adequate showers and exercise during his brief
stay in the RHU was sufficiently serious to deprive him of the “minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities.”  Id.  Even a minimal provision of time for exercise and recreation
may satisfy constitutional requirements.  See, e.g., Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446,
449 (8th Cir. 1992) (forty-five minutes of exercise per week not constitutionally infirm);
Knight v. Armontrout, 878 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) (the denial of outdoor
recreation for thirteen days does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment).  Thus, we
agree with the District Court that Fortune’s alleged harm was insufficiently serious to
implicate the Eighth Amendment.
Fortune also claims that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
changing his migraine medication from Cafergot to Midrin, thus failing to provide him
with adequate medical care.  To establish a violation of the right to adequate medical
care, a plaintiff must show a serious medical need and acts or omissions by prison
officials that indicated a deliberate indifference to that need.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976).  Fortune failed to provide evidence suggesting that the Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.  While Fortune argues that Cafergot was
more effective in treating his symptoms, the fact that he received a medication other than
Cafergot does not amount to a constitutional violation.  See White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d
103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (doctor’s choice of one drug over another is not actionable). 
     To the extent Fortune also claims that he was denied adequate access to showers and4
exercise and that his medication was changed in retaliation for filing grievances, we agree
with the District Court that Fortune has failed to set forth any evidence suggesting that
was the case.
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Moreover, there is no indication that the decision to provide Fortune with a medication
other than Cafergot was based on an ulterior motive beyond routine patient care within
the confines of the prison’s policies.  4
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Fortune also claims that his due process rights were violated as a result of his
placement in the RHU on two separate occasions in June and July 2002.  As mentioned
earlier, Fortune was issued two separate misconducts in June 2002.  The first resulted in
fifteen days of confinement in the RHU.  As a result of the second misconduct, he was
placed in the RHU for an additional thirty days.  The District Court correctly noted that an
inmate’s due process rights are not triggered unless the prison “imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).  Here, Fortune was placed in RHU for a
total of forty-five days.  We have made clear that this type of confinement does not
constitute an “atypical and significant hardship” so as to trigger due process rights.  See
Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that fifteen months in
segregation was not an atypical and significant hardship). 
The District Court also correctly granted summary judgment in favor of
     Fortune also claimed that the funds were being deducted at an unlawful rate.5
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Defendants on Fortune’s claim that the misconduct reports, which resulted in his
disciplinary custody in the RHU, were falsified.  As discussed above, Fortune was not
subjected to “atypical and significant hardship” when he was placed in RHU following
his misconduct charge.  Id.  Therefore, because he  was not deprived of a protected liberty
interest, his challenge to the misconduct charge is actionable only under § 1983 if
Defendants issued the misconduct in retaliation for his having exercised a constitutional
right.  See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333.  As we discussed earlier, Fortune did not present any
facts that would establish a retaliatory motive behind either misconduct charge.  Summary
judgment was therefore appropriate.
Deductions from Fortune’s Inmate Account
Lastly, the District Court properly granted Defendants second motion for summary
judgment on Fortune’s remaining claim that funds were improperly deducted from his
inmate account.  Fortune had argued that Defendants Patterson and Scott violated his due
process rights, as well as the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, by
improperly deducting monies from his inmate account in 2001.   Specifically, he claimed5
that they improperly withdrew $1,310.03 from his account for the payment of fines, court
costs and/or legal fees in connection with two earlier federal lawsuits.
We agree with the District Court that Fortune cannot sustain this claim under 
§ 1983.  Fortune failed to set forth any evidence suggesting that Defendants Patterson and
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Scott had any personal involvement in deducting money from his account.  In fact, the
record reflects the deductions were made by an individual not named in the instant
lawsuit who was, at that time, employed at SCI-Camp Hill.  Defendants Patterson and
Scott were employed at SCI-Greene.  Furthermore, there is no evidence demonstrating
that they were personally involved in assessing the amount of money appropriate to be
deducted from Fortune’s account.  Because Fortune did not demonstrate any facts, if
proven true, that would show that Defendants Patterson and Scott were involved in the
deduction of funds from his account, his claims against them cannot be sustained under 
§ 1983.  See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
As Fortune’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm. 
See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Fortune’s motion for appointment of counsel is
denied.
